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COMMENTS
PREEMPTION, ASSASSINATION, AND THE WAR ON
TERRORISM 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The horrifying images of New York's falling twin towers intro-
duced the world to a new breed of terrorism. While America had con-
fronted terrorism before September 11, its previous incarnations were
not nearly as coordinated, lethal, or personal as the attacks inflicted
against its citizens in New York City, Washington D.C. and Penn-
sylvania.2 These unprecedented attacks propelled the United States
into a national dilemma as how to best deal with terrorism and weap-
ons of mass destruction ("WMD"). 3
President Bush responded to this new threat by promulgating the
National Security Strategy of the United States of America ("National
Security Strategy"),4 which expanded the country's right to defend
itself by preemptive action. The strategy is based, in large part, on a
recognition that "traditional concepts of deterrence will not work
against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction
1. Special thanks to Mae Arlene Ennis.
2. On 11 September 2001, four commercial airliners were hijacked by members of
al-Qaeda and were deliberately crashed into the World Trade Center towers and the
Pentagon. See generally Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World
Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al; NBC
News, Osama bin Laden: FAQ, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/627355.asp (last
visited October 24, 2004).
3. See 50 U.S.C. 2302(1) (2004). A "weapon of mass destruction" is defined as
"any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious
bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or
impact of - (A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease
organism; or (C) radiation or radioactivity." Id.
4. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Sept.
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html. The National Security
Strategy was issued by Bush on September 20, 2002 in accordance with the Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which mandates an
annual report to Congress detailing the National Security Strategy of the United States.
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and the targeting of innocents . . . ." The strategy also warns that the
United States "must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capa-
bilities and objectives of today's adversaries. '"6 By doing so, rogue
states who pose a threat to America become legitimate military targets
whether or not they are demonstrably linked to global terrorist organi-
zations. The administration argues that the continued spread of WMD
technology to states with a history of aggression creates an unaccept-
able level of risk, and presents "a compelling case for taking anticipa-
tory actions to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the
time and place of the enemy's attack."7
Bush's new doctrine correctly identifies the unique challenge the
War on Terror presents-both the nature of the enemy and the war
have dramatically changed. Unlike the adversaries faced in World
Wars I and II, religious fanatics, ethnic separatists, and suicide bomb-
ers are impervious to traditional diplomacy or military deterrence.8
The difficulty is only compounded by the absence of a state with
which to negotiate or to hold accountable. Furthermore, today's ter-
rorists are not concerned with limiting civilian casualties; for Islamic
jihadists, in particular, success is actually measured by the number of
dead they leave in their murderous wake.
Recognizing both the war and the enemy are unconventional, deci-
sions must be made regarding the types of tactics that are both legal
and effective in quelling future attacks. Under Bush's new strategy of
preemption, one viable option for the United States is the anticipatory
use of assassination against key terrorist leaders. While it is generally
true that both U.S. policy 9 and international law1° prohibit assassina-
5. Id. at 15.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 19.
8. See generally Alan Einisman, Ineffectiveness at Its Best: Fighting Terrorism with
Economic Sanctions, 9 MINN. J. GLOB. TRADE 299 (2000).
9. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401(1981). "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States
Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." Id.
10. See U.N.G.A. Res. 40/61, 9 December 1985. Within the domain of
international law, the "Charter" or "U.N. Charter" dominates the meaning and scope
of the "use of force." Specifically, Article 103 articulates its supremacy in "the event of
a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." U.N. CHARTER art. 103, para. 2.
Additionally, "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other matter inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id. art. 2,
para. 4. The first enumerated "purpose" for the United Nations is "to maintain
254 [Vol. 27:253
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tion as a means to remove a rogue or disfavored leader, exceptions do
apply during times of war.
The purpose of this comment is to provide a legal framework
which supports the use of assassination as a preemptive instrument
against terrorism. In doing so, this comment will: (1) offer a sensible
definition for assassination and its relationship to war; (2) examine
both the historical and political underpinnings of the current United
States policy on assassination; and (3) review sources of international
customary and treaty law to extrapolate guidelines for using assassina-
tion overseas in the War on Terror.
II. THE ANATOMY OF ASSASSINATION
The debate over whether the United States may legally assassinate
terrorists has been perpetuated, in large part, by the lack of a uniform
definition for the term." This has led many to erroneously conclude
that military activities which involve the targeting of terrorist leaders
necessarily violate domestic and international law. Such mistaken con-
clusions are drawn principally from equating political murders com-
mitted during peacetime with the strategic elimination of enemy
leaders during war. In an effort to clarify, this section will examine the
important distinctions between how assassination should be defined
both during peacetime and in times of war.
A. Assassination During Peacetime Defined
The term "assassination" typically conjures up visions of mur-
dered U.S. leaders or snipers from the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) gunning down foreign heads of state that are deemed obstacles
to American interests. Those quick to claim assassination is patently
illegal rely on an overly broad definition that fails to distinguish
international peace and security and, to thar end, to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts
of aggression or other breaches of the peace." Id. art. 1, para. 1. For a discussion on the
four exceptions to the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force, namely force that is:
(1) used in self-defense; (2) authorized by the Security Council; (3) undertaken by the
five major powers before the Security Council is functional; and (4) undertaken
against the 'enemy' states of the Second World War. See generally ANTHONY CLARK
AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN
CHARTER PARADIGM 31 (1993). Also see Walter Enders et al., UN Conventions, Technology
and Retaliation in the Fight Against Terrorism: An Econometric Evaluation, 2 TERRORISM
& POL. VIOL. 94 (1990).
11. Daniel B. Pickard, Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and International Law, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 9 (2001).
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between war and peace. 12 W. Hays Park of the Office of the Judge
Advocate General 13 considers an act of assassination, which falls
outside the scope of war, as "the murder of a private individual or pub-
lic figure for political purposes, and in some cases... also requires that
the act constitute a covert activity, particularly when the individual is a
private citizen. '"14
This should not be confused, however, with the right of a nation
to defend itself even during times of peace.' 5 For example, the United
States has used precision force in the past to capture or kill those
responsible for threatening its citizens' well-being; the 1986 attacks on
military targets, including Colonel Qaddafi's headquarters, were in
response to several terrorist attacks against U.S. soldiers underwritten
by the Libyan Government.' 6 This operation was conducted without
the benefit of an official war declaration by the United States. Thus, a
nation's choice to defend itself by targeting terrorists during peacetime
appears to have no practical distinction from responding to a threat by
a sovereign nation during a time of war. 1 7
B. Assassination During Wartime Defined
Whether a nation is at war greatly influences how assassination is
ultimately defined. 8 The political component is eliminated from the
analysis because all death during war is considered politically moti-
vated.1 9 Furthermore, the requirement that a killing be conducted in a
covert manner is also removed as stealth is an indispensable advantage
when engaging the enemy.2 °
Instead of political motive or secrecy, the common theme in most
definitions of wartime assassination is the notion of treachery. Profes-
sor Michael Schmitt, considered one of the leading scholars on the law
12. See Pickard, supra note 11, at 9.
13. W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination,
1989 ARMY LAw. 4 (1989).
14. Id. at 4.
15. Although international law generally prohibits assassination, great latitude is
provided to countries when taking measures to protect their national security Id. at 7.
16. See generally Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 U.S Airstrike on Iraq to the
1986 Bombing of Libya: The New Interpretation of Article 51, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
99 (1994).
17. Id.
18. See Pickard, supra note 11, at 9.
19. Nathan Canestaro, American Law and Policy on Assassinations of Foreign
Leaders: The Practicality of Maintaining the Status Quo, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1,
12 (2003).
20. See Parks, supra note 13, at 5.
256 [Vol. 27:253
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of assassination, concludes that wartime assassination consists of two
elements, "the targeting of an individual, and the use of treacherous
means."21 He argues that treachery is the essential component of war-
time assassination, defining it as a "breach of confidence.
' 22 To illus-
trate, Schmitt lists possible forms of treachery: (1) a treacherous
killing of a specifically targeted person is an assassination; (2) falsely
inducing the victim into believing he is safe will likely be treachery; (3)
the victim's status as a non-combatant does not lessen the treacherous
quality of the killing; (4) the disproportionateness and the lack of
necessity surrounding the targeted act of killing has some bearing on
whether it is treacherous.23 Under this definition, a killing during war
cannot be an assassination unless it is accomplished by treacherous
means (usually a violation of the law of war) and is a killing of a specif-
ically targeted individual. In short, if the law of war is not violated, an
assassination has not occurred.
The British Manual of Military Law defines assassination as the
"the killing or wounding of a selected individual behind the line of
battle by enemy agents or partisans .... 24 This definition would seem
to follow the definition of assassination found in the law of war, a law
that finds its roots in the Hague prohibition against "treacherous kill-
ing."'25 Focusing on the concept of treachery, a 1965 journal article
defined assassination as "the selected killing of an enemy by a person
not in uniform."26 The author explained that the killer's choice not to
wear a uniform was the very definition of treachery. Although this view
is reflective of the traditional view of a treacherous attack, after World
War II, it was no longer considered a breach of military rules of
engagement.27
21. Michael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic
Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 632 (1992).
22. Id. at 633. "The essence of treachery is a breach of confidence. For instance, an
attack on an individual who justifiably believes he has nothing to fear from the
assailant is treachery." Id. (internal citation omitted).
23. Id. at 641-42.
24. WAR OFFICE, THE LAw OF WAR ON LAND, BEING PART III OF THE MANUAL OF
MILITARY LAW, art. 115 (1958) (U.K.), reprinted in 10 DIG. INrr'L L. 390 (1968).
25. Schmitt, supra note 21, at 614-16.
26. See Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Kelly, Assassination in War Time, 30 MIL. L.
REv. 101, 102 (1965).
27. See Parks, supra note 13, at 6. Prior to World War II, the law of war required
soldiers to don uniforms so they could be distinguished from the civilian population.
It was therefore considered a "treacherous killing or wounding" for a soldier to
disguise himself in civilian clothes to carrying out a surprise attack on an enemy
force.
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Another scholar, Major Tyler J. Harder, believes that a thorough
definition of assassination must include three indispensable elements:
"(1) a murder, (2) of a specifically targeted figure, (3) for a political
purpose. ''28 What is unique for Harder is that the killing must be a
murder-an intrinsically illegal act typically outside the zone of war-
fare. Understanding the scope of Harder's definition, however, is frus-
trated by the lack of a universal definition of murder. Some believe that
regardless of the circumstances, the State is prohibited from taking
life.29 For them, all killing is without moral justification and should be
illegal.3°
Scholars have noted that some of the confusion between murder
and justified killing comes from mistranslations of Biblical texts.3 ' For
example, in the Decalogue at Exodus 20:13 and Deuteronomy 5:17,
the King James Version of the Bible states incorrectly the prohibition,
"Thou shalt not kill."32 The Hebrew word for kill is not used in these
prohibitions. Instead, the word used is "o tirtzach," which "refers only
to the criminal act of homicide, not [for example] taking the life of
enemy soldiers in legitimate warfare. ' '33 In fact, the Book of Deuteron-
omy contains a detailed war code that provides for the protection of
Hebrew citizens by authorizing the killing of enemy combatants. 34
Thus, the Judeo-Christian tradition not only provides for permissible
killing, but acknowledges that death on the battlefield is not necessa-
rily the result of the sinful and unjustified act of murder.
Assassination is therefore a killing that is manifestly illegal; it is
not merely the taking of human life as part of a larger war effort. Juris-
prudentially, assassination must amount to murder, an act accompa-
nied with some form of intent35-a state of mind not generally
attributed to combatants during war. As will be discussed later, this
important distinction has been obfuscated by certain references made
by U.S. officials to a "wartime exception" for using assassination. Such
an "exception" incorrectly implies that assassination has two contex-
tual definitions: during peacetime, assassination is an illegal act of
murder; conversely, assassinations conducted during a war are merely
28. Major Tyler J. Harder, Time to Repeal the Assassination Ban of Executive Order
12,333: A Small Step in Clarifying Current Law, 172 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002).
29. See generally Austin Sarat, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN CONDITION (2001).
30. Id.
31. R.B. THIEME, JR., FREEDOM THROUGH MILITARY VICTORY 50-51 (3d ed. 1996).
32. Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17 (King James).
33. See Thieme, supra note 31, at 50-51.
34. Deuteronomy 20:13 (King James).
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (7th ed. 1999).
258 [Vol. 27:253
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justified killings. Using the same word (assassination) to describe
actions taken either during times of peace or as part of a war strategy,
perpetuates confusion and debate over its permitted use. In truth,
there are no assassinations during war, only targeted killings as a tac-
tic to prevail over the enemy.
C. Brief History of Assassination During War
While it is true that the American frame of reference for assassina-
tion primarily includes the killing of U.S. Presidents, the concept has
its roots firmly planted in antiquity.36 The etymology of assassination
has been traced to the Arabic word "hashishiyyin," which refers to an
eleventh century Muslim brotherhood who were devoted to killing
their enemies by any means available.37
Moreover, as far back as the thirteenth century, scholars began to
write concerning the ethical and legal underpinnings of using assassi-
nation during times of war.38 Such writers as Sir Thomas More, St.
Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius all addressed the moral and prac-
tical dilemmas accompanying the use of assassination as a wartime
tactic.39 One recent scholar noted, "none of [these writers] asserted
that a leader or particular member of an opposing army enjoyed abso-
lute protection, or was not a legitimate target of attack."40 In fact, "[t]he
consensus of these early commentators that an attack directed at an
enemy, including an enemy leader, with the intent of killing him [or
her] was generally permissible, but not if the attack was a treacherous
one."' This position taken by the early scholars is also fairly consis-
tent with current international law.4 2
Hugo Grotius, considered by some as the father of international
law, drafted the first codification of guidelines pertaining to military
conduct during wartime.4 3 He devoted much time to the subject of
assassination and how it "violates an express or tacit obligation of
36. FRANKLIN L. FORD, POLITICAL MURDER: FROM TYRANNICIDE TO TERRORISM 99-102
(1985).
37. Id.
38. See Harder, supra note 28, at 6.
39. For further information regarding these and other authors, see generally
Lieutenant Commander Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict,
134 MIL. L. REv. 123, 126-130 (1991); See also Jeffrey F. Addicott, Proposal for a New
Executive Order on Assassination, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 751, 760, 764-65 (2003).
40. See Zengel, supra note 39, at 125.
41. See Pickard, supra note 11, at 16.
42. See Harder, supra note 28, at 7-8.
43. See Hugo Grotius, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (1625) reprinted in 1 LAW OF
WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 16 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
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good faith" between countries. 44 According to Grotius, it was a viola-
tion of natural law or "the law of nations"' 45 if the leader was slain by
someone who had an obligation to him-an act otherwise considered
as "treacherous. '46 Conversely, if the enemy leader was ambushed or
tricked into being captured and is killed, this does not violate natural
law. 4 Grotius expressed it this way: "It is in fact permissible to kill an
enemy in any place whatsoever.... According to the law of nations not
only those who do such deeds, but also those who instigate others to
do them, are to be considered free from blame. '48 In sum, Grotius
frowned upon the placing of a price on the head of an enemy leader as
it would encourage his subjects to slay him by assassination.49
Within United States military history, the first mention of assassi-
nation was during the Civil War. This mention was found in one of the
first codifications of American military rules of engagement known as
the Lieber Code.5 0 The Union Forces adopted the Lieber Code and in
the spring of 1863, it was promulgated under the name "Army General
Orders Number 100."5 1 It stated in part:
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belong-
ing to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile govern-
ment, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor, any
more than the modern law of peace allows such international out-
lawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest retaliation
should follow the murder committed in consequence of such procla-
mation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations look with hor-
ror upon offers or rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses
into barbarism.5
2
Later, in 1907, the prohibition reflecting the customary law relat-
ing to "treacherous killing" during wartime was included in the Annex
to Hague Convention IV.5 1 More specifically, Article 23 states, "it is
44. Id. at 38.
45. The term "law of nations" was an early synonym for international law. See U.S.
CONST. ART. I, §8, cl. 10.
46. See Grotius, supra note 43, at 39-40.
47. Id. at 39.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 40-41.
50. Addicott, supra note 39, at 767. See THE LIEBER CODE: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY
OF WAR, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 158-
186 (Leon Friedman ed. 1972) [hereinafter THE LIEBER CODE].
51. See Addicott, supra note 39, at 767-68.
52. See THE LIEBER CODE, supra note 50, at para. 148.
53. See Hague Convention IV, Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in 1 THE LAW OF WAR:
260 [Vol. 27:253
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especially forbidden .... (b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals
belonging to the hostile nation or army .... ,"54 However, interpreting
the provision contained in Article 23, the Army Field Manual of
1956,15 stated:
This article is construed as prohibiting assassination, proscription, or
outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well
as offering a reward for an enemy "dead or alive." It does not, however,
preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in
the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere. 56
Thus, the historical documents agree that it is a violation of both
military and international law to target an individual for treacherous
killing, to place a bounty on the capture of the adversary, or to offer a
reward for the enemy's capture or dead body. Yet, according to the last
sentence of paragraph 31 of the Army Field Manual referenced above,
it seems that Article 23 of the Annex does not place a prohibition in
toto on the killing of enemy leaders; the Annex only prohibits encour-
agement for the assassination to take place from within the enemy
leader's own ranks.
III. THE AMERICAN POLICY AGAINST ASSASSINATION
On February 18, 1976, President Ford signed Executive Order
11,905, which specifically prohibited "political" assassination as a
matter of national policy.5 7 The order states, "No employee of the
United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in,
political assassination." s5 The straightforward language of the prohibi-
tion has remained relatively unchanged 59 throughout the years and
was even renewed both by President Carter in 19786° with Executive
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 313-323 (Leon Friedman ed. 1972); see also Schmitt, supra
note 21, at 609, 621.
54. See Harder, supra note 28, at 9.
55. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (July
1956).
56. Id. at para. 31 (emphasis added).
57. See Exec. Order No. 11,905, § 5(g), 3 C.F.R. 90, 101 (1977), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
58. Id.
59. Executive Order signed by Carter deleted the assassination modifier "political"
and added the phrase "acting on behalf of." The order as modified stated, "No person
employed or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or
conspire to engage in assassination." Id.
60. See section 2-305 of Exec. Order No. 12036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1978). President
Carter issued the executive order for the chief purpose of reshaping the intelligence
structure.
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Order 12,036 and the Reagan administration in 1981 with Executive
Order 12,333.61
Despite the ban on assassination receiving nearly three decades of
executive support, the 2001 attack appears to have provided some
members of Capital Hill with an incentive to lobby for its removal.62
Certain members of Congress challenged the prohibition with the "Ter-
rorist Elimination Act of 200 1,"63 submitted to the House International
Relations Committee by Georgia's Republican Congressman Bob
Barr.64 The Act claims that the assassination prohibitions "limit the
swift, sure and precise action needed by the United States to protect
our national security."65 Furthermore, the Act observes that the "pre-
sent strategy allows the military forces to bomb large targets hoping to
eliminate a terrorist leader, but prevents our country from designing a
limited action which would specifically accomplish that purpose. 6 6
Barr's bill also notes "on several occasions the military has been
ordered to use a military strike hoping, in most cases unsuccessfully,
61. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401(1981).
62. Terrorist Elimination Act of 2003, H.R. 356, 108th Cong. (2003).
63. This was the third out of four attempts by Barr to nullify the ban on
assassination. See generally Terrorist Elimination Act of 1998, H.R. 4861, 105th Cong.(1998); Terrorist Elimination Act of 1999, H.R. 1403, 106th Cong. (1999); Terrorist
Elimination Act of 2001, H.R. 19, 107th Cong. (2001); Terrorist Elimination Act of
2003, H.R. 356, 108th Cong. (2003).
64. House Bill HR 19 was designed to specifically nullify sections of three previous
Executive Orders including one initiated by Ronald Reagan in 1981 (Section 5(g) of
Executive Order 11905, Section 2-305 of Executive Order 12306, Section 2.11 of
Executive Order 12333). The findings of Congress in HR 19 were as follows: 1) past
Presidents have issued Executive orders which severely limit the use of the military
when dealing with potential threats against the United States of America; (2) these
Executive orders limit the swift, sure, and precise action needed by the United States to
protect our national security; present strategy allows the military forces to bomb large
targets hoping to eliminate a terrorist leader, but prevents our country from designing
a limited action which would specifically accomplish that purpose; on several
occasions the military has been ordered to use a military strike hoping, in most cases
unsuccessfully, to remove a terrorist leader who has committed crimes against the
United States; (5) as the threat from terrorism grows, America must continue to
investigate effective ways to combat the menace posed by those who would murder
American citizens simply to make a political point; and (6) action by the United States
Government to remove such persons is a remedy which should be used sparingly and
considered only after all other reasonable options have failed or are not available;
however, this is an option our country must maintain for cases in which international
threats cannot be eliminated by other means. For further discussion on the debate for
removal of the ban, see Harder, supra note 18.
65. Id.
66. Id.
[Vol. 27:253
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to remove a terrorist leader who committed crimes against the United
States.'67 Before September 11, Barr was unable to find a co-sponsor
for his Terrorist Elimination Act; however, during the period from Sep-
tember 12 through October 5, fourteen representatives signed on as co-
sponsors.68
In contrast, the Bush administration's approach was not to
directly challenge the existence of the ban, but rather to attempt to
define its post 9/11 relevance. After viewing the devastation left by the
attacks, President Bush seemed to think the ban was not applicable,
vowing to "[dlo whatever is necessary to protect America and Ameri-
cans,"69and "[h]unt down and punish those responsible for [those]
cowardly acts."'70 Attempting to make good on his word, Bush signed
an intelligence "finding" on October 21, 2001, instructing the CIA to
engage in "lethal covert operations" to destroy Osama bin Laden and
his al-Qaeda organization.7 ' White House and CIA lawyers defended
the intelligence "finding," claiming it was constitutional because the
ban on political assassination does not apply to wartime. 72 They fur-
ther contended that the United States has the right to defend itself
against terrorists.73
67. Id
68. Rep Goode, Virgil H., Jr. - 9/12/2001; Rep Mclnnis, Scott - 9/12/2001; Rep
Tancredo, Thomas G. - 9/12/2001; Rep Jones, Walter B.,Jr. - 9/12/2001; Rep Sessions,
Pete - 9/12/2001; Rep Souder, Mark E. - 9/12/2001; Rep Graves, Sam - 9/14/2001;
Rep Everett, Terry - 9/14/2001; Rep Young, Don - 9/14/2001; Rep Vitter, David - 9/
14/2001; Rep Ney, Robert W. - 9/21/2001; Rep Hefley, Joel - 9/21/2001; Rep Terry,
Lee - 9/28/2001; Rep Foley, Mark - 10/5/2001. Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HROOO19:@@@P (last visited March 30, 2005)
69. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2 0 0 1/09/20010911-1.html (issued
from the Office of the Press Secretary, September 11, 2001)(last visited October 24,
2004).
70. Id. On September 11, 2001, in a press briefing White House Press Secretary
Ari Fleischer referred to a conference between the President and the national security
team (via live tele-conference from Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska) where the
president was to have said "We will find these people and they will suffer the
consequence of taking on this nation. We will do what it takes." http://
www.whitehouse.gov /news/releases/2001/0 9 / 2 0 0 10911-8.html (issued from the
Office of the Press Secretary, September 11, 2001) (last visited October 24, 2004).
71. Bob Woodward, CIA Told to Do 'Whatever Necessary' to Kill Bin Laden; Agency
and Military Collaborating at 'Unprecedented' Level; Cheney Says War Against Terror
'May Never End', WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A01.
72. Id.
73. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3077 (2004) which defines terrorism as something that
(a) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation
if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and; (b)
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Based on the actions of Barr and the White House, there appears
to be some confusion between the Legislative and Executive branches
as to whether the United States' policy against assassination applies to
the War on Terror. A better understanding of the scope of the prohibi-
tion's application requires a review of its origins in American history.
A. Historical Background of Ford's Executive Order 11,905
1. The Game
The events, which ultimately led to Executive Order 11,905, com-
menced in the early 1970s as allegations began surfacing that the CIA
was engaging in questionable activities both domestically and abroad.
The Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, testified in April of
1974 before a subcommittee of the House of Armed Services Commit-
tee in response to certain allegations of CIA involvement in Chile.7 4
Director Colby's testimony found its way into the press 7 5 and eventu-
ally resulted in such shocking headlines as, "Huge C.I.A. Operation
Reported in U.S. Against Anti-War Forces. ' 76 News stories contained
allegations that the CIA was conducting clandestine spy operations
within U.S. borders. Due to public outcry, President Ford had no
choice but to take immediate steps to repair the damage. Accordingly,
on January 4, 1975, he signed Executive Order 11,828 and thereby
established a Commission on CIA Activities within the United States. 77
The Commission later became known as the Rockefeller Commission
after President Ford appointed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to be
its Chairman.7 8
Shortly after the creation of the Rockefeller Commission, more
press reports began circulating, this time suggesting CIA operatives
were involved in certain assassination attempts on foreign leaders.79
Congress finally stepped in and created its own committees to investi-
appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of
a government by assassination or kidnapping. Id.
74. See Harder, supra note 28, at 11-12.
75. Id. at 12.
76. See Seymour Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Anti-War
Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at 1.
77. Exec. Order No. 11828, 40 Fed. Reg., 1219 (Jan. 7, 1975).
78. Part of the Commission's duties under the executive order was to submit a
report to the President detailing the Commission's findings. See id. On June 6, 1975,
the Commission submitted its final report entitled "Report to the President by the
Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States."
79. See Boyd M. Johnson, III, Executive Order 12333: The Permissibility of an
American Assassination of a Foreign Leader, 25 CORNELL Ir'uL.J. 401, 407 (1992).
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gate the accusations. On January 27, 1975, the Senate created the
Church Committee, named after its Chairman, Senator Frank Church
of Idaho."° On February 19, 1975, the House of Representatives cre-
ated the Pike Committee, named after Representative Otis Pike of New
York."'
The primary concerns of the Church Committee were allegations
that the CIA played a role in assassination plots against foreign heads
of state. The Commission was charged with the responsibility of inves-
tigating intelligence activities that were "illegal, improper or unethi-
cal. ' ' 2 After exhaustive hearings and investigation, the Church
Committee published its findings in a detailed report in November of
1975, entitled "Alleged Assassination Plots Involved Foreign Lead-
ers." 3 The investigation concentrated on allegations of CIA involve-
ment in assassination plots against five foreign leaders: (1) Fidel
Castro of Cuba; (2) Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic; (3)
Patrice Lumumba of the Congo (now known as Democratic Republic
of the Congo); (4) General Rene Schneider of Chile; and (5) Ngo Dinh
Diem of South Vietnam. 4 It was determined that four of these plots
involved CIA attempts at overthrowing governments controlled by the
targeted leadership. Rene Schneider, however, was allegedly targeted to
prevent a new government from coming into power.8 5
Fidel Castro
Fidel Castro, the Committee found, was the target of eight sepa-
rate assassination plots involving the CIA from 1960 to 1965.86 He was
considered a direct threat to the national security of the United States.
Some of the plans to kill Castro included poisoning his cigars,8 7 using
snipers, and planting an explosive device in a seashell to be placed at
80. Frederick P. Hitz, Responses To The September 11 Attacks: Unleashing the Rogue
Elephant: September 11 and Letting the CIA be the CIA, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 765,
775 (2002). Senator Frank Forrester Church was elected to the Senate as a democrat in
1956 where he served as chairman for both the Select Committee Government
Intelligence Activities and Committee on Foreign Relations.
81. Id.
82. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS: AN INTERIM REPORT
OF THE SELECT COMMITrEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT To
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 94-465, at 1 (1975) [hereinafter CHURCH REPORT].
83. See id. at 2 (stating that the Committee conducted an extensive investigation
that resulted in over 8,000 pages of sworn testimony and 60 days of hearings).
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id.
86. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 82, at 71.
87. Id. at 73.
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his favorite diving spot."8 The Committee also found that known mem-
bers of the mafia arranged, with assistance from the CIA, to have a
Cuban official who owed gambling debts to the mafia place poison
pills in Castro's drink. 9 Nevertheless, the committee could not deter-
mine which President had given authorization, Presidents Eisenhower,
Kennedy, or Johnson.90
Rafael Trujillo
Although Trujillo had been a benefactor of U.S. support in his
early years, it was later feared that he was evolving into another Castro
because of his penchant for brutality.9' Consequently, in 1960, in an
effort to overthrow his regime, the CIA provided Dominican dissidents
with three carbines and three pistols, encouraging their use on Tru-
jillo.92 Although he was eventually assassinated, the Committee con-
cluded the U.S. did not instigate the plot that ended Trujillo's life.93
The Committee still found, nonetheless, that by providing weaponry to
dissidents, "[the U.S.] was implicated in the assassination.."9'
Patrice Lumumba
The Committee also felt confident there was sufficient evidence of
a U.S. plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. 95 President Eisenhower, in
the summer of 1960, vocalized his concerns over Lumumba's leader-
ship position as Premier of the Congo and his affiliation with the
Soviet Union.96 The evidence showed that the Director of the Central
Intelligence construed Eisenhower's unequivocal opposition as a green
light to plan and carry out Lumumba's assassination. 97 The Commis-
sion also had evidence showing that the CIA had sent certain biologi-
cal "poisons" to the Congo for use on Lumumba and even had taken
preliminary steps to gain access. 98 Nevertheless, before the CIA could
complete the job, Congolese rivals killed Lumumba. 99
88. Id. at 85.
89. See Schmitt, supra note 21, at 655.
90. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 82, at 263.
91. Id. at 191.
92. Id. at 191-192.
93. Id. at 191.
94. Id. at 6.
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id.
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General Rene Schneider
With regard to General Rene Schneider, the Commander-in-Chief
of the Chilean Army, the Committee found there were three CIA-
assisted attempts to kidnap him.1 °° In September 1970, Salvador
Allende Gossens won Chile's presidential election to which the U.S.
was very much opposed.' 0 ' President Nixon was so distraught with the
prospects of having Gossens as President of Chile, he ordered the CIA
to organize a military coup designed to prevent Gossens from taking
office. 10 2 General Schneider opposed the coup and believed that the
constitutional electoral process should be followed. Since he was con-
sidered an obstacle to the cause, Schneider was to be kidnapped;
unfortunately, during the course of the third kidnapping attempt, he
was shot and killed. 10 3 The Committee determined that despite United
States providing money and weapons to the coup members, "the inten-
tion of both the dissidents and the United States officials was to
abduct General Schneider, not to kill him."'0 4
Ngo Dinh Diem
Finally, the President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, and his
brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated on November 2, 1963, also
as part of a military coup. 10 5 The Committee found that the CIA pro-
vided support and encouragement to conduct the coup; yet, there was
no evidence to support an allegation that the U.S. officials desired
Diem's death.10 6 The Committee left open the possibility that the
assassination was without U.S. involvement and was likely incident to
Diem's refusal to resign or surrender to the dissidents.
10 7
The Committee, throughout its findings, generally denounced the
use of assassination, yet made one important exception: during times
of war. It found that the United States should not engage in its use and
"short of war, assassination is incompatible with American principles,
international order, and morality."'0 8 Furthermore, the report indi-
cated that if an individual leader might pose an imminent threat to the
100. Id. at 225-226
101. Id. at 225.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 5, 226.
104. Id. at 5-6.
105. Id. at 217.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
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United States, that leader might be preemptively targeted for
assassination.10 9
The Committee, not satisfied with the CIA's published directives
in 1972 and 1973 prohibiting assassination, recommended "a flat ban
against assassination should be written into law."'11 The Committee
went even further and actually included a proposed statute with its
report, which also included a "wartime" exception. 1 The statute
made it a federal crime to assassinate, attempt to assassinate, or con-
spire to assassinate a foreign leader based on political views, actions,
or statements. 11 2 The exception, however, provided for assassinating
foreign officials whose governments were the subject of a "declaration
of war" by the United States "or against which United States Armed
Forces have... been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant
to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution .... ,113
2. Political Gamesmanship
Although President Ford made several public statements address-
ing the allegations of CIA involvement in assassination plots around
the globe, he did not formally respond with Executive Order 11,905
until after the Church Committee report was leaked to the press."14
Among these statements, Ford declared, "I am opposed to political
assassinations. This administration has not and will not use such
means as instruments of national policy. 11 5 He also remarked later, "I
have issued specific instructions to the U.S. intelligence agencies that
under no circumstances should any agency in this Government, while
I am President, participate in or plan for any assassination of a foreign
leader.""16
109. See Schmitt, supra note 21, at 658.
110. The Committee stated, "We condemn assassination and reject it as an
instrument of American policy. Surprisingly, however, there is presently no statute
making it a crime to assassinate a foreign official outside the United States.
Hence, .. the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute making it a
Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to do so." CHURCH
REPORT, supra note 88, at 281.
111. Id. at app. A.
112. Id.
113. Id. at app. A(e)(2).
114. See Johnson, supra note 79, at 408 (1992) (citing news conference held on
November 26, 1975).
115. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 82, at 281 (citing Presidential Press Conference, 6/
9/1975, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 611).
116. See Johnson, supra note 79, at 408 (1992) (citing news conference held on
November 26, 1975).
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Nevertheless, Ford's reassurances became rather hollow when the
embarrassing details of CIA assassination plots contained in the com-
mittee's report were made public. With pressure mounting both
domestically and abroad, it appears Ford appears acted defensively
when issuing Executive Order 11,905 in an effort to obviate more
restrictive legislation. 117 In fact, due to the new political climate, the
Senate was already proposing to charter an intelligence agency that
would regulate governmental covert actions. 118 However, it was too
late-Ford had beaten them to the punch. By addressing the central
concerns of the Church Committee, Executive Order 11,905 removed
the driving force from the Senate's proposals and they would eventu-
ally become political chaff." 9
The Church Committee's recommendation to Congress to enact a
statute criminalizing assassination was ultimately dismissed and no
law has since been created that even addresses the issue. This is true
despite three separate attempts by members of Congress to have laws
passed which would criminally sanction participation in assassina-
tion.' 2 ° A bill was introduced in 1976 which stated: "whoever, except
in time of war, while engaged in the duties of an intelligence operation
of the Government of the United States, willfully kills any person shall
be imprisoned for not less than one year.' 121 Two years later there was
an attempt to make clarifications to Ford's executive order. 122 In a final
attempt to pass a law, both the House and Senate introduced legisla-
tion that merely tracked the language of Carter's Executive Order
12,036.123
B. War and Peace
Given the history behind Ford's Executive Order 11,905, it would
be reasonable to conclude that the assassination prohibition only
applies during peacetime. The prohibition's scope would include sce-
narios similar to those that were subject to the investigation of the
Church Committee. It was the objectionable activities of the CIA, con-
ducted during peacetime, which ultimately led to Ford's policy against
117. See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authorityfor National Security
Surveillance, 50 Am. UL. REv. 1, 35 (2000).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Bert Brandenburg, The Legality of Assassination as an Aspect of Foreign
Policy, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 655, 685-86 n.195 (1987).
121. Id. (emphasis added) (citing H.R. 15542, 94th Cong. § 9(1) (2d Sess. 1976)).
122. Id. (citing S. 2525, 95th Cong. § 134(5) (2d Sess. 1978)).
123. Id. (citing H.R. 6588, 96th Cong., § 131 (2d Sess. 1980) and S. 2284, 96th
Cong., § 131 (2d Sess. 1980)).
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assassination. Moreover, the Committee's proposed statute and the bill
introduced by Congress in 1976 also support the conclusion that the
anti-assassination policy does not apply during times of war. Not only
would the policy not apply, but the report further reasoned that under
certain circumstances an individual leader might pose an imminent
threat to the United States, and therefore could be anticipatorily
assassinated.
The next logical question is whether the United States is currently
at war. According to Article 1, § 8 of the constitution, Congress is
authorized but not required to declare war.124 In fact, Congress has
formally declared war only five times in history. 125 Congress last
declared war against Japan in World War 11.126 The declaration came
on December 8, 1941, one day after the Pearl Harbor attack.12 7 Yet, the
absence of an official war declaration from Congress has not prevented
the United States from taking military action, either by brief incur-
sions such as the 1986 Libya bombings, 128 or more protracted opera-
tions. 129 In point of fact, the United States has deployed its military
over 200 times in its history.13 ° Since World War II alone, American
forces have been deployed over 50 times to "hot spots" around the
globe, most notably Vietnam, Korea, and the Persian Gulf in 1991.1"
Legally, the common justification for these more recent deployments
has been for self-defense, a right reserved under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, which provides: "Nothing in the present Char-
ter shall impair the inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations...,32
124. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
125. See generally STEPHEN DYcuS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 261, 334 (3d ed.
2002).
126. See Declaration of War-World War II, S.J. Res. 116 (Dec. 8, 1941), reprinted in
JOHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAw DOCUMENTS 694 (1995).
127. See id.
128. The Reagan administration dropped bombs on Libyan leader Moammar
Qaddafi's home in 1986 in retaliation for the bombing of a Berlin discotheque
frequented by U.S. troops.
129. See DYcuS ET AL., supra note 125, at 334.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The UN Charter prohibits of the use of force, save two
exceptions: the exercise of the right of self-defense in response to an armed attack as
mandated under Article 51 of the Charter; and the right of the Security Council, under
Chapter 7, to authorize military action. A third, emerging exception-humanitarian
intervention to avert international crimes such as genocide or crimes against
[Vol. 27:253
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In our present situation, Congress has not formally declared war
on Iraq. However, on October 12, 2002, Congress passed a joint reso-
lution, authorizing President Bush to utilize military force against
Iraq. 133 Having the force of law,134 the joint resolution authorized
Bush "to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to
be necessary and appropriate in order to... defend the national secur-
ity of the United States against the continuing threat posed by
Iraq.... ,135 With authority given by Congress, the United States sent a
considerable number of military forces to Iraq and has even received
assistance from allies. With the number of causalities mounting in
Iraq, no one can doubt we are indeed at war.
C. Opposition Seeks Repeal of Executive Order.
Although it is clear that the United States is in a de facto state of
war, many have still sought to have the ban on assassination removed.
As stated before, this is likely due to confusion resulting from the same
word being used to describe both lawful killing and murder. The brev-
ity of the executive order, which provides no definition for assassina-
tion and does not distinguish between permissible and impermissible
killing, only exacerbates the problem. 136
Senator Jesse Helms also did not help the confusion when he pro-
claimed on the day of the September 11 attacks that he favored taking
whatever action necessary, including assassination, to bring the cul-
prits to justice: "I hope I will live to see the day when it will once again
be the policy of the United States of America to go after the kind of
sneaky enemies who created this morning's mayhem."' 37 The follow-
ing week, senior news correspondent Daniel Schorr also urged policy-
makers to repeal the ban on assassination. 138 Schorr wrote, "A 25-year-
old executive order reflecting the reaction to mindless cold-war plotting
humanity-arguably requires Security Council authorization, which was sought before
intervention in Kosovo. Id.
133. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002) (enacted by HJ. Resolution 114)
[hereinafter IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002].
134. See FRANK CUMMINGS, CAPITOL HILL MANUAL 4 (1976) (stating that a joint
resolution "must meet the same requirements as a bill, and if passed becomes a law
with fully the same legal effect... as a bill").
135. IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002, supra note 133, at § 3(a)(1).
136. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 2.11, 3 C.F.R. at 213.
137. Chuck McCutcheon, Flawed Intelligence: No Easy Fix, 59 CONG. Q., 2145, 2146
(2001).
138. Daniel Schorr, Stop Winking at "the Ban," CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 21,
2001, at 11. Schorr also points out that he advocated changing Executive Order 12,333
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against President Castro and other third-world leaders seems totally
anachronistic after Sept. 11." 1' 9 He continued, "It is time to rescind an
assassination ban that has no more reason for existing." 140 This was
followed shortly by Barr's proposed bill in the House of Representa-
tives, which would nullify the relevant parts of the executive order.14 1
Notwithstanding the onslaught of attacks from members of Congress,
no legislation has been passed that would repeal the peacetime ban on
assassination.
The White House eventually weighed in on the debate; former
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer told reporters the ban "does not limit
America's ability to act in self-defense.' 1 42 The eradication of terrorist
cells could require, Fleischer remarked, "acts which involve the lives of
others.' 43 Fleischer may or may not have understood exactly what
amounted to assassination. At an October 1, 2002 press conference,
Fleischer was vocal about his support of foreign actors seeking the
opportunity to assassinate Saddam Hussein. 144 When asked about the
costliness of war with Iraq, he remarked: "The cost of a one-way ticket
is substantially less than [the cost of war] .... The cost of one bullet, if
the Iraqi people take it on themselves, is substantially less than
that.'1 45 Although the people of Iraq assassinating Hussein on their
own accord would not violate United States policy, reporters followed
up by asking whether Bush was endorsing the use of assassination. 146
Fleischer conspicuously stopped short of referring to the term "assas-
sination" and ultimately sidestepped the issue. 14 7
Remarkably, what Fleischer and the White House seem to misun-
derstand is that encouraging others to assassinate their leader is an act
of treachery, inconsistent with the spirit of U.S. policy (and interna-
in 1991 to "spare us from presidential double-talk about designs on the lives of foreign
foes."' Id (internal quotations omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Terrorist Elimination Act of 2001, H.R. 19, 107th Cong. (2001) (seeking to
nullify section 2.11 of Executive Order 12,333).
142. Nancy Benac, Assassination Ban Gets New Look, Associated Press, Sept. 22,
2001, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/O9/apO92201.html.
143. Id.
144. See Walter Pincus, Attack May Spark Coup in Iraq, Say U.S. Analysts, WASH.
POST., Oct. 6, 2002, at Al.
145. Id.
146. See Fleisher Backs Hussein's Slaying: "One Bullet" Less Costly Than War, Bush
Spokesman Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2002, at A12 "Asked whether the administration
was advocating the assassination of Hussein, Fleischer repeatedly replied: "Regime
change is welcome in whatever form that it takes."
147. Id.
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tional law). This is exactly what the Church Committee criticized the
CIA for doing. 4 ' Due to Fleischer's comments, the news media contin-
ued to speculate up until the Iraqi invasion that "members of [Hus-
sein's] inner circle in the final days or hours before U.S. forces launch
a major ground attack" would likely assassinate him.' 49 Notwithstand-
ing the White House's error in apparently encouraging assassination,
it must be remembered that the U.S. preemptively targeting and killing
enemy leaders during wartime is not deemed treacherous under its
own policy.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASSASSINATION
As previously noted, the challenge associated with the continuing
global War on Terror is that both the nature of the enemy and the
threat have changed radically. This has had a tremendous impact upon
the arithmetic of war, requiring the United States to consider uncon-
ventional alternatives in an effort to balance the military equation. As
was discovered in the 2002 aerial bombing campaign in Afghanistan,
local terrorists' infrastructures were mostly unaffected by the attacks,
unlike the more identifiable and public Taliban regime. 150 It revealed
how ineffective traditional warfare is against state-sponsored terrorism;
terrorist organizations often grow and strengthen under the protection
of rogue governments, yet manage not to share in their
vulnerabilities. 151
Although there are many indications that international law con-
demns assassination, there are few actual laws that specifically pro-
hibit it. Only the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter
expressly outlaws assassination by name. 152 Furthermore, the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internation-
ally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York
148. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 82.
149. See, e.g., Pincus, supra note 144. (noting Defense Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld has "spoken publicly about Iraqis eliminating Hussein themselves, either
through assassination or sending him into exile").
150. Michele L. Malvesti, The New World Disorder: Bombing Bin Laden: Assessing the
Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
17, 26 (2002); for more discussion on ineffective methodologies in fighting terrorists
see DAVID C. MARTIN & JOHN WALCOTT, BEST LAID PLANS: THE INSIDE STORY ON
AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST TERRORISM (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 311.
151. See Roy Godson, DIRTY TRICKS OR TRUMP CARDS: U.S. COVERT ACTION AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995), 161-64, 173-74, 180-83.
152. See Schmitt, supra note 22, at 618 n. 37.
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Convention) protects against it under very limited circumstances. 153
Having been ratified by nearly half of the world's nations along with
most major powers, the New York Convention only criminalizes "the
international commission of ... murder, kidnapping, or other attack
upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person. "154
Thus, this Convention only accords limited protection to certain
figures while traveling across national borders-not within their own
states. 155
Some have interpreted Article 4 of the U.N. Charter as a source of
international prohibitions on acts of cross-border violence such as
assassination by civilians or military forces. This interpretation is
based on the Article having established the right of a country to be free
from aggression and the use of international armed force: "Article
2(4): All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations. '1 5 6 Moreover, this principle has been
accepted among courts and scholars to represent customary interna-
tional law. In Nicaragua v. United States, the International Court of
Justice found, quoting from the work of the International Law Com-
mission, that Article 2(4) is a "conspicuous example of a rule in inter-
national law having the character of jus cogens. ' 7 As such,
assassinating a foreign leader during peacetime, without provocation,
would be a violation of international law.
Nevertheless, the protections provided under Article 2(4) are sus-
pended under two well-established situations: (1) military action that
,has been sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter and (2) a legitimate act of self-defense. 158
Although Article 51 of the Charter provides for the right to self-
153. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14 1973, art. 2,
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION, Oct.
28, 2001, available at http://www.undcp.org/ terrorism-convention protected_
persons.html.
154. Id. at art. 2, § 1.
155. See Schmitt, supra note 21, at 619 n.44.
156. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
157. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I.Cj. 14, para. 190
(June 27), available at http://www.gwu.edu/jaysmith/nicus3.html [hereinafter
Nicaragua] (last visited October 28, 2004).
158. INT'L AND OPER'L LAW DEP'T, U. S. ARMY JUDGE ADvoc. GEN. SCH., OPERATIONAL
LAw HANDBOOK 2-3, (Maj. Mike 0. Lacey & Cdr. Brian J. Bill eds., 2001) [hereinafter
OPERATIONAL LAW].
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defense, the threatened Member is not allowed to act preemptively:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security."
15 9
This requirement by the Charter that any Member state acting in
self-defense must be attacked first has been the subject of controversy
due to the recent invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration argues
that, notwithstanding the Charter's language, the United States has a
right of preemptive self-defense. With the convergence of terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction and rogue states in the post-September
11 universe, awaiting an armed attack can convert the UN Charter into
a suicide pact. 160 Yet, most scholars would agree that even allowing for
a more flexible interpretation of the right of self-defense, international
law requires at least credible evidence of the imminence of such an
attack."6
This question of imminence, that would validate an act of self-
defense, was one of the important issues considered in the Caroline
case. 162 This precedent arose from an 1837 incident in which British
troops launched an attack into the United States to destroy a ship, the
Caroline, that had been smuggling arms and volunteers to Canadian
secessionists. 163 Claims by the British that the attack was justified
were rejected by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who
responded by describing under what conditions a right to self-defense
could be recognized:
It will be for [the British] to show a necessity of self-defence,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation. It will be for it to shew [sic], also, that the local
authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment
authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did
159. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
160. Patrick McLain, Settling The Score With Saddam: Resolution 1441 and Parallel
Justifications for the Use of Force Against Iraq, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 233, 265
(2003); See also George Shultz, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, 86
DEPT. STATE BULL. 15, 17 (Mar 1986).
161. See generally Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International
Law In Combatting Terrorism: A Maginot Line For Modern Civilization Employing The
Principles of Anticipatory Self-Defense & Preemption, 55 A.F. L. REv. 87 (2004).
162. Robert F. Teplitz, Taking Assassination Seriously: Did the United States Violate
International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?, 28
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 569, 569 (1995).
163. See id. at 575-76.
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nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the neces-
sity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly
within it. 164
Caroline's requirements-an imminent threat, a necessary action,
a reasonable response, and the exhaustion of peaceful means165-over
time have defined the customary standard for anticipatory self-
defense, even finding support by the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg in 1946.166
Although Caroline provides some guidance to Article 51, scholars
like Major Schmitt claim that the criterion for imminence is "rela-
tive"; 167when the state is determining whether the requirements have
been satisfied, it should weigh the severity of the threat before taking
preemptive action.'16 Thus, under Schmitt's sliding scale approach, the
greater the legitimate threat, the more legally permissible the anticipa-
tory attack becomes. 169 This analysis, however, seems better suited to
traditional threats and will likely fail when applied to modern terror-
ism; one of the distinctive features of the War on Terror is the difficulty
in locating and destroying the enemy before they strike. 170 It is reason-
able for the United States, therefore, to attack preemptively despite
having only tenuous evidence supporting the legitimacy of the threat.
Many of the world powers agree that they can utilize the require-
ments of Caroline to justify attacking terrorists as a real threat to their
national security. 171 Furthermore, these strikes could take place
within the borders of states that promote or harbor such groups.' 72 In
fact, the Caroline requirements permit anticipatory assaults into the
sovereignty of other states that are harboring terrorists. With the types
of weapons available to terrorists-nuclear and biological-it would be
unreasonable for the state anticipating victimization to wait until an
attack actually occurs. The number of potential casualties for such a
strategy could number in the hundreds of thousands or perhaps in the
millions.
164. Id. at 577 quoting 1 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS: REPORTS AND
PAPERS FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL PRINT, PART I, SERIES C, NORTH AMERICA,
1837-1914, (Kenneth Bourne ed., 1986) Document 99 at 159 (letter from Webster to
Fox, April 24, 1841).
165. Id at 577.
166. See Johnson, supra note 79, at 418-19.
167. See Schmitt, supra note 21, at 647-48.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 647.
170. Id. at 648.
171. OPERATIONAL LAW, supra note 158, at 3.
172. Id.
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Hence, international law allows the threatened country to make
an anticipatory strike so long as it is instigated at the last practicable
moment the threat can be forestalled successfully. On the other hand,
if the threat is pervasive and continuing, the timing of the defensive
action is legally irrelevant. This is an important distinction as it per-
tains to assassination; if the threat of attack is continuous, an anticipa-
tory killing will not likely be construed as being merely politically
motivated. Nevertheless, to the extent the action taken fails to meet the
standards of self-defense, it may be viewed as an assassination with no
legal justification. Moreover, if a preemptive act of self-defense is tanta-
mount to a traditional armed conflict like the current war in Iraq, the
only legal issue germane to assassination is the concept of "treach-
ery"-encouraging assassination from within the enemies' own ranks.
V. CONCLUSION
The Bush administration's decision to preemptively target for
death, as part of a broader effort in the War on Terror, such terrorist
leaders as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,173 is violative of
neither domestic nor international customary treaty law. These and
other terrorists present a constant threat to the national security of the
United States, rendering an anticipatory strike against them permissi-
ble. What may be legally tenuous for America, however, is the practice
of offering monetary or other incentives to either members of terrorist
organizations or citizens of rogue countries like Iraq and Afghanistan
to kill their own leaders. In the final analysis, when the United States
seeks to justify tactics used to win the War on Terror, the international
community must be convinced the actions were strictly a matter of
self-defense and were conducted without treachery.
David Ennis
173. Osama bin Laden's top deputy appeared in a videotape broadcast on an Arab
television network, vowing that al-Qaeda would attack the United States again. In the
tape Ayman al-Zawahiri said A1-Qaeda was already planning for more suicide strikes.
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/ meast/02/24/qaeda.tapes/
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